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T
Preface

he following is the text of a talk I gave at the 2006 National Conference
on Undergraduate Research. It outlines the salient results of research
which I began in 2005 in preparation from my undergraduate
thesis. These results aim at a theoretical analysis of certain monastic
deployments of silence and their relevance to socio-epistemological problems
identified by certain contemporary social theorists.
Introduction
Eight Quotations:
Everywhere the masses are encouraged to speak, they are urged to live socially,
electorally, sexually, in participation, in festival, in free speech…The spectre must
be exorcised, it must pronounce its name. Nothing shows more dramatically
that the only genuine problem today is the silence of the mass, the silence of the
silent majority (Baudrilard 1983, 23).
Who sits in solitude and is quiet hath escaped from three wars: hearing, speaking,
and seeing (Waddell).
But this silence is paradoxical—it isn’t a silence which does not speak, it is a
silence which refuses to be spoken for in its name. And in this sense, far from
being a form of alienation, it is an absolute weapon (Baudrillard 1982 21-2).
I have endowed him with my spirit that he may bring justice to the nations. He
does not cry out aloud, or make his voice heard in the streets (Isaiah 42:2).
Should we initiated an information dietetics? Should we thin out the obese, the
obese systems, and create institutions to uninform? (Baudrillard 2001)
Go and sit in thy cell, and thy cell shall teach thee all things. (Waddell).
…Now, in fact, the masses have no history to write, neither past, nor future,
they have no virtual energies to release, nor any desire to fulfill; their strength
is actual, in the present, and sufficient unto itself. It consists in their silence, in
their capacity to absorb and neutralize, already superior to any power acting on
them… (Baudrillard 2001, 2).
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From the beginning I have been silent. I have kept quiet, kept
myself in check. I groan like a woman in labor. I suffocate, I stifle
(Isaiah 42:14).
The preceeding words were those of theorist Jean Baudrillard,
the Christian desert monastics, and, finally, Yahweh himself.
Taken together they create a dialogue about the strategic
power of deployment and retention, discursive practice and
intuitive reticence, the a/historical capacities of speech and of
its refusal. These concerns can be summarized in terms of two
questions: What are the powers silence? And why should they be
exercised?
For the past year I have been writing a thesis which addresses
these questions in two parts. In the first part I posit a socioepsitemological problem: The ultra-proliferation of information
accompanying the global economy has constituted the sublation
or displacement of conventional forms of meaning in the West.
The second part analyzes a system of physical, epistemological,
theological, and philosophical structures which has theorized
and deployed silence as a meta-sign for counter-culutral practice.
This is the Catholic tradition of Cistercian Monasticism. The rest
of this brief talk will be aimed at giving you a sense of how each
main part of my thesis addresses my two intial questions.
I. And why should they be exercised?
The input/output of electronic media has replaced physical
production as the driving force behind political, economic, and
interpersonal life; thus “information age” becomes a platitutide.
What is not widely acknowledged is that this shift in cultural
geography constitutes a violent reconfiguration of human
epistemologies. Our idea of “knowledge” and how to access it is
inextricably linked to the possibilities we have for representing,
viewing, and cognizing word and image. As McLuhan noted:
…After three thousand years of exploration, by means of
fragmentary and mechanical technology, the Western world
is imploding…[electronic technology] is reshaping and
restructuring patterns of social interdependence and every
aspect of our personal lives…Whether the extension of our
consciousness, so long sought by the advertisers for specific
products, will be “a good thing” is a question which admits of
a wide solution. (McLuhan 3)
McLuhan’s anxiety about the ultimate social effects of this shift
has been born by out by the present condition of conventional
channels of meaning and by the irruption in the kinds of sources
by which meaning is thought to originate. Let us consider this
irruption of epistemic venues in terms of two conventionally
Western meaning-structures: social discourse, natural science,
and ontology.

The Social
Since the immediate aftermath of Gutenberg and continuing
until the late 20th century the Western model of social
discourse has been characterized by the propositional nature of
speech and text and by the quantitative limits which analogue
mediums imposed on them. In other words, social discourse
was thought most appropriate when it took the form of rational
argumentation expressed within the structural limitations of
speeches, newspapers, and books. Neil Postman writes:
To engage the written word means to follow a line of thought,
which requires considerable powers of classifying, inferencemaking and reasoning… It also means to weigh ideas, to compare
and contrast assertions, to connect one generalization to another.
(Postman 51)
Conventional Western understandings of the nature of meaning
are related to both this notion of propositional interconnectedness
and to the quantitative limitation of information through
analogue formats. Meaning is concerned with integrating
diverse informational fragments in such a way as to construct an
intelligble, purposive reality. For this to occur it is necessary that
information be manageable in terms of its context, quantity, and
cognizability.
Speech and text, however, are no longer primary in the sphere of
the social. Rather, the perpetual flicker of the image has become
the model both of social “knowledge” itself and of the appropriate
avenues of its exchange. This is to be seen in clearly documented
phenomena such the hegemony of television in domestic life,
the decline of the newspaper, the 24 hour news feed and its 30
second sound bites (Stephen 10). The problem here is twofold.
Firstly, image-based media do not structurally allow for the kind
of propositional argumentation which has historically consituted
the social; the graphics of the poll replace the op. ed. letter as the
voice-space of the masses. Secondly, the speed of the digital has
proliferated information to such a staggering degree that it casts
the process of coherently integrating informational fragments
into a space of improbability and pastiche. Or, as Baudrillard
puts it, this new epistemological currency constitutes “…..a
liquidation of all referentials…a material more malleable than
meaning in that it lends itself to all systems of equivalences, to
all binary oppositions, to all combinatory algebras” (Baudrillard
1994, 2).
The Scope of Nature
Earlier I spoke of the onset of the digital economy as consituting
a shift in cultural geography. In in a sense, it is a shift in physical
geography—or at least in the relation between physical space and
our “knowledge” of the natural world. The speed and ubiquity of
the digital constructs a world of perpetual presence which is at
the same time ontologically displaced by its fundamental status
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as presentation or projection of electronic media. Paul Virilio
describes this situation in terms of optical perception:
This is an active (wave) optics, replacing in a thoroughgoing
way the passive (geometric) optics of the era of Galileo’s
spy-glass. Anddoing so as though the loss of the horizonline of geographical perspective…necessitated…a substitute
horizon: the “artificial horizon” of a screen or monitor,
capable of permanently displaying the new preponderance
of media perspective over the immediate perspective of
space. (Virilio 14)
This imposition of a new perpceptual horizon—a new, total
“place-ness” of media—carries our discussion from the
epistemological to the ontological. What is it to be in a world
delimited by virtual space, by the tele-present?
Simulation
For Baudrillard the answer is that meaning-structures such as
ontology no longer have anything to signify--nor do they signify
nothing. Rather, they operate as simulations: virtual signs which
neither point to a reality nor deny a truth. Rather, they obviate the
difference between affirmation and denial. Baudrillard writes:
Something has disappeared: the sovereign difference, between
one and the other, that constituted the charm of abstraction.
Because it is difference that constitutes the poetry of the map
and the charm of the territory, the magic of the concept and the
charm of the real. The imaginary of representation…disappears
in the simulation whose operation is nuclear and genetic, no
longer at all specular or discursive. It is all of metaphysics that is
lost…(Baudrillard 1994, 2)
Meaning is an anachronism….
Or is it? Despite his avowed nihilism, Baudrillard does offer
glimpses of strategies which might oppose the simulacrum of
information-culture. Virtually all of these glimpses focus on
tecnhniques of absence, reduction, negation, and silence. In
Fatal Strategies Baudrillard poses a question which I quoted
earlier. “Should we initiate an information dietics? Should we
thin out the obese, the obese systems, and create institutions
to uninform?” (Baudrillard 2001, 193) In a manner of speaking,
the rest of this paper is about an institution to uniform. Really,
it is about a way of thinking and living which uses silence as
constructive strategy and a deconstructive weapon in order to
preserve a model of meaning in the reality of its practioners.
II. What are the powers of silence?
The monastic order of Cistercians was founded at very end of
the 11th century by french Benedictines looking for a simpler
and more rigorous observation of the Benedictine rule. This
included a strict observance of silence which became a central
T H E U N D E R G R A D U AT E R E V I E W

concept as the Cistercians theorized their practice in opposition
to succeeding worldy cultures. In order to get a sense of what this
practice has entailed I invite you to consider one aspect of the
Cistercian strategy:
Silence and The Binary
Echoing the impossible unity of a tripartite God, Cistercian
thought does not see silence as functioning through dialectical
opposition; silence is not opposed to language, effacement
to support, destruction to stability. Rather, these events are
constituted by the same act of sublimation. The author of a
monastic training book writes:
They had adopted the famous maxim of St. Arsenius: Fuge,
tace, quiesce; fly from everything that diverts you from God,
observer an interior and exterior silence that so you may be
enabled to hear the voice of God, allay all agitation of mind
and heart in order to enjoy repose in God (SD 36).
This stands in contrast to the conventional Western understanding
of legitimate conceptual reasoning. Following Aristotle’s law of
non-contradiction, Westerners generally understand meaning
in binary terms: true/false, action/inaction, speech/silence.
Historically, capitalist ethics and Enlightenment heritage work
together, providing their own mythology of meaning; it’s motto:
“paucity of meaning must be countered with informational
maximalization. Or, in binary terms: information/enlightenment/
meaning // silence/darkness/meaninglessness.
Following the model of the crucifixion—the ultimate silencing
which becomes the final redemption, Cistercian theory rejects
meaning as a binary modality.
Silence as Epistemology
This rejection is closely linked to the Cistercian understanding
of silence as an alternative espistemological space which moves
between rationality and intuition. Silence becomes a mode of
discernment or listening which by its very emptiness deconstructs
information and provides an extra-rational context in which
specific kinds of meaning emerge. Thus we read the opening line
of the Bendectine Rule: “ Listen my son, and with your heart hear
the principles of your Master” (RB Prologue). It is significant that,
from antiquity to the medieval period, the conceptual “heart”
was seen as the bodies’ epistemological space, circumscribing
intellectual and spiritual activity. Also related to the idea of
“discernment” or listening is the notion of God as the Word. Like
ordinary language the Word is something which allows for and
even demands understanding and exchange. Unlike ordinary
language the Word requires a special mode of relation, the extrarationality of engaged silence. For this reason Cistercian daily life
is structured as rigorously staged performance of choreographed
speech, silence, and text.
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Conclusion
Perhaps what Cistercianism recommends to the laymen or
secular is a perversely meaningful version of what Baudrillard
calls “the strategy of the object” (Baudrillard 2001 85). This is
the strategy of non-resistance, inertia, and refusal to respond.
Note that in this strategy one acts paradoxically by renouncng
subjectivity in order to achieve desired ends. Conversely, on this
model (which is entirely consonant with Cistercian practice) it is
the active acceptance of subjectivity which deters one from the
strategic goal.

I hope that by now it is clear why I began with the quotations I
did. Discourses as diverse as Catholic theology and postmodern
theory—discourses which deny each other’s foundational claims—
often have much to say to each other in light of a particular
problematic. I hope that, as limited this talk has been, you have.
some intimations of why we are “urged to live socially, electorally,
sexually, to pronounce [our] name,” why Isaiah’s bringer of justice
“does not cry aloud or make his name heard in the streets,” why
Yahweh has kept quiet, kept himself in check, how silence can be
“an absolute weapon.”
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